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Abstract
This paper explores the determinants of victimization at the neighborhood level, using
data from the French victimization survey. Its contribution to the economics of crime
literature is threefold. First, I provide evidence that neighborhood characteristics explain
victimization better than individual characteristics. Second, I find that local unemploy-
ment rate is one of the most important factor explaining victimization, with a particularly
large effect on small crimes such as motorbike theft or vandalism. I then tackle the endoge-
nous location selection issue, by adopting the strategy developed by Bayer et al. (2008),
based on the fact that the study is conducted at a very low geographic level. Third, I take
advantage of the precise localization of the data to adopt a spatial approach, comparing
the effect of unemployment rate in the reference neighborhood and in adjacent neighbor-
hoods. The results support the idea that criminals are mobile across neighborhoods for
more serious economic crimes, in line with the Beckerian theory of crime, but that petty
crimes and vandalism do not involve any mobility, relating to the social disorganization
theory.
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1 Introduction
Some factors such as a high population density or a large unemployment rate, are known for
rising crime rates. Living in a deprived US county, Italian province or French department
hence puts one at a higher risk of being victim of a criminal event than living in a prosperous
region. Yet, such a statement may hide important spatial disparities: a region characterized
by well-defined social and economic attributes generally encompasses very heterogeneous ar-
eas. As we zoom in and focus on smaller and smaller areas, the relationship between social,
economic or demographic characteristics and crime rates established at more aggregate levels
may be altered. Consider for instance two adjacent neighborhoods, a prosperous one and a
depressed one. Admittedly, unemployment breeds crime, so that the depressed neighborhood
will be a nest for criminals. Those criminals may act in their own neighborhood, but they may
as well travel to the more attractive adjacent neighborhood. At some point, there could even
be a negative relationship between a neighborhood unemployment and crime rates. Alterna-
tively, a dual crime market could exist, with different types of crimes committed in different
neighborhoods (e.g. vandalism in poor neighborhoods and burglaries in wealthy areas). This
simple example illustrates the idea that studying crime from a more microeconomic perspec-
tive can challenge some of the established results, and lead to a better understanding of the
mechanisms behind criminal events. In particular, adopting a local approach allows the re-
searcher to ask or revisit the following questions. What are the local determinants of crime?
To what extent is the probability to be victim of a criminal event in a given neighborhood
affected by the characteristics of surrounding areas? Can we observe a duality in crimes, with
some crimes explained by intrinsic neighborhoods characteristics and others explained by the
characteristics of more distant areas?
This paper answers these questions taking advantage of the French victimization survey
that provides detailed information localized at a very low geographic level (a 2,000 inhabitants
neighborhood). Note upfront that the survey asks whether individuals have been victims of
any criminal event, that is victimized, but does not inform about people committing crimes.1
Hence, I am able to characterize the circumstances of a crime and the victim, but not the
criminal. Three important findings emerge from this study. First, neighborhood characteris-
tics explain victimization better than individual characteristics, except for assaults. Second,
among the various neighborhood characteristics considered, unemployment rate appears as
the most relevant factor having a positive effect on victimization. Third, adopting a spatial
approach reveals that for crimes such as burglaries and thefts of objects from cars, the effect
of unemployment rate in surrounding neighborhoods is stronger than the effect in the neigh-
borhood where the crime took place, while the reverse is true for smaller crimes.
1I will henceforth use the term victimized to refer to someone having been victim of any criminal event
(from property to violent crimes and vandalism). Similarly, a victimization will refer to the event making one
a victim.
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The present work differs from the previous literature by exploring the determinants of
victimization at a very low geographic level. The geographic unit considered, called IRIS, is a
2,000 individuals neighborhood and is the smallest census tract unit for which representative
indicators can be constructed in France. Instead, existing results are generally obtained using
more aggregate data: Gould et al. (2002) and Kelly (2000) rely on US counties, which add
up to 3,140 units for the whole country; Buonanno et al. (2009) and Bianchi et al. (2012)
are based on 95 Italian provinces; Machin and Meghir (2004) rely on 43 police force areas for
England and Wales; and Fougère et al. (2009) use data from the 96 French départements. An
exception is Bell et al. (2010) who study the impact of immigration on crime using data from
371 local authorities across England and Wales. Although I am not questioning the validity
of the results based on aggregate data, I think that they present an important drawback.
These studies fail to account for criminals’ mobility, implicitly assuming that the offenders
commit crimes in the area where they live (e.g. provinces), ignoring the heterogeneity across
neighborhoods within this broad area (in terms of economic conditions for instance). By
contrast, I argue that according to the type of crime and the expected pay-off, criminals
might either operate in their own neighborhood or travel to a remote area. It is for instance
reasonable to think that thieves are more likely to live in deprived neighborhoods and to
steal from wealthier (possibly neighboring) areas, while young delinquents will not have any
incentives to bear transportation costs in order to vandalize cars in a distant neighborhood.
Zenou (2005) provides some theoretical background for this idea in an urban economics model
explaining the link between crime and location by highlighting the role of the housing market.
In particular, distance to the city center (where jobs and crime opportunities are located)
affects the decision to commit crime instead of working by increasing commuting costs and
reducing housing rents. The idea that distance and mobility matter in criminal decision also
finds some empirical support in the criminology literature. It documents that the places where
perpetrators commit crimes often differ from their area of residence, and that the distance
between the two locations varies with the accessibility of the target area, the type of crime and
the offender’s characteristics (see Bruinsma (2007) for a detailed survey on the Netherlands,
and Bernasco and Luykx (2003) for an analysis of criminals’ target location choice). Working
at a very local level enables me to add a spatial dimension to the study of crime, which is
a key input to the literature. I am indeed able to compare the effects of the characteristics
of adjacent neighborhoods on crime and therefore to capture more precisely the mechanisms
behind the relationships obtained with aggregate data.
In addition to allowing for the localization of the surveyed individuals at the neighbor-
hood level, the victimization survey data used in this paper present several valuable features.
First, in some cases, it is possible to know where the victimization took place, and hence to
control for the characteristics of this location. By contrast, studies relying on police data
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usually consider the location of the police station where the crime was reported rather than
the location of the event itself. Second, these data provide detailed information on individu-
als, so that relevant individual characteristics pertaining to potential victims’ attractiveness
can be taken into account, while they are ignored in most of the existing literature. Finally,
victimization surveys are known for avoiding the under-reporting issue from which reported
police data suffer. Not only are individuals less likely to report personal offenses or small
property crimes to the police, but criminal attempts or threats are also not always taken into
account by police forces. Relying on victimization survey data is thus particularly insightful
regarding petty crimes and assaults. Distinguishing between petty crimes such as vandalism
and more important economic crimes shows quite relevant, as these different types of crimes
turn out be driven by different channels.
The nature and the quality of these data enable me to answer the questions asked above.
Regarding the local determinants of crime, I show that social, economic and demographic
neighborhood characteristics are more important than individual characteristics in explaining
victimization. This result is particularly strong for petty crimes such as motorbike theft
or car vandalism. It holds for all types of crime considered except for assault for which
individual characteristics dominate. It therefore looks as if offenders target neighborhoods
rather than precise households or individuals. In particular, among the various neighborhood
characteristics considered, unemployment rate appears as the most relevant factor, while
factors such as the share of immigrants in the neighborhood are not important in explaining
victimization. The subsequent results of this paper hence focus on the role of unemployment
on victimization. The coefficient for local unemployment rate is positive and its magnitude is
particularly strong for small crimes such as motorbike theft or vandalism. Therefore, it seems
that crimes committed in more deprived areas relate more to social disorganization theory
(e.g. Shaw and McKay, 1942) than to rational economic crime theory à la Becker. Note that
these results are obtained after correcting for the biases related to endogenous sorting, as will
be explained below.
Finally, in order to test the idea that perpetrators may actually move across neighborhoods
to commit economic crimes, I adopt a spatial approach that consists in controlling for both
reference neighborhood and adjacent neighborhoods characteristics. The results show that
for crimes such as burglaries and thefts of objects from cars, the effect of unemployment rate
in distant neighborhoods is stronger than the effect in the reference neighborhood, while the
reverse still holds for smaller crimes. Otherwise stated, for a given local unemployment rate,
being surrounded by higher unemployment areas increases the probability of being burgled,
but does not affect vandalism. Rather, vandalism is boosted by larger local unemployment
rates for a given level of unemployment in the surrounding neighborhoods. This tends to
support the idea of criminals mobility for some types of crime, e.g economic crimes, in line
4
with Becker’s theory, but not for other types of crimes (petty crimes and vandalism), relating
instead to the social disorganization theory. This result is, to my opinion, the most important
finding of this work. It helps understand the mechanisms behind the finding that, at larger
geographic level, unemployment increases crime: unemployment would have a direct local
effect on small crimes versus a remote effect on more serious economic crimes. Not only does
it mean that the relationship between unemployment and crime is not trivial as we focus on
smaller areas, but that this relationship also depends on the type of offense. This result shows
the importance of taking criminals’ mobility into account, and implies that distance, geogra-
phy and transport infrastructure might be worth getting more attention in future research on
crime.
This paper obviously relates to the large economics of crime literature, initiated by Becker
(1968) and Ehrlich (1973). The hypothesis developed in these seminal papers is that the
decision to engage into criminal activities is the result of a rational cost-benefit analysis. Most
empirical research on the economics of crime aims at testing this hypothesis, which implies
that economically weaker individuals (e.g. unemployed workers) have a higher propensity to
commit crime because they face lower opportunity costs. Part of the literature hence focuses
on economic factors, revealing that lower wages (Gould et al., 2002), larger unemployment
rates (Fougère et al., 2009) or more inequality (Kelly, 2000) generate higher crime rates.
Alternatively, several studies concentrate on demographic factors such as population density:
Glaeser et al. (1996) show that crime is rifer in denser and more populated areas due to
extended social interactions. A similar idea is developed by Calvó-Armengol et al. (2007) and
Patacchini and Zenou (2008) who show the importance of social relationships, in particular
of weak ties,2 in criminal behavior. A growing literature also focuses on the role played by
immigration, and provides evidence that its causal impact on crime is not significant or only
very moderate. For instance, Bianchi et al. (2012) demonstrate that the share of immigrants in
Italian provinces has only a marginal effect on crime rates through robberies. Other studies,
such as Spenkuch (2010) or Bell et al. (2010) show that the effect is driven by the most
economically deprived immigrants. On another aspect, Buonanno et al. (2009) insist on the
role of social norms and show that they tend to reduce property crimes.
Incidentally, the low geographic focus of this study binds it to the literature on neigh-
borhood effects. A major concern in this literature is that households usually sort across
neighborhoods in a non-random fashion. It is then possible that some unobserved household
or individual characteristics influence both the propensity to be victim of a criminal event and
neighborhood characteristics, therefore biasing the results. Several methods have been used
in the literature to overcome this endogenous sorting issue, such as randomized experiments
2Weak ties are simple acquaintances, doing contrast to strong ties which are usually close friends and close
relatives
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or instrumental variables, that will be detailed more carefully in the paper. The approach
adopted in this study follows Bayer et al. (2008) and builds on the very local nature of the
data. The idea is that although households are able to select a given area in which they want
to live, they are, however, unable to select a precise neighborhood within this given area.
Therefore, once the characteristics of the larger selected area are controlled for, the remain-
ing variation of unemployment rates across the smaller neighborhoods can be considered as
exogenous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data: I describe
the victimization survey, and explain the particular geographic structure of the data. The
empirical results are given in three distinct sections. Section 3 explores the determinants
of the various types of victimization and compares the role of contextual versus individual
characteristics. Section 4 deals with the issue of endogenous location selection, following the
approach developed by Bayer et al. (2008). Section 5 is devoted to the new spatial approach,
where I focus on the role of unemployment in the reference neighborhood versus adjacent
neighborhoods, in an attempt to account for distance. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data overview
The French victimization survey (Cadre de Vie et Sécurité - Living Environment and Secu-
rity, INSEE, CVS henceforth) is a repeated cross section, representative of mainland France
households. It has been conducted annually since 2007 and each wave contains approximately
16,000 observations (one per household). The latest wave I use is the 2011. For each type
of victimization considered in the CVS survey, the respondent is asked whether it occurred
at least once over the two years preceding the survey. Various types of victimization affect-
ing households in general are considered. These are mostly property thefts (or attempts)
and acts of vandalism: burglary, attempt of burglary or theft without breaking in the main
home (burglary), car theft or attempt, (car theft), motorbike (or scooter) theft or attempt
(motorbike theft), bike theft, act of vandalism on the main home (home vandalism), act of
vandalism on the car (car vandalism), and theft of objects from the car (car objects theft). I
will henceforth refer to these types of victimization as household victimization. In addition,
one randomly selected individual in each household is asked about his/her personal experi-
ence of victimization over the past two years.3 In this paper, I will consider three types of
individual victimization: robbery, theft and assault.4 The shares of households and individuals
victims of a given type of victimization at least once over the previous two years are displayed
3The member of the household selected to answer to the individual part of the survey is the person above
14 years old whose birthday is the closest to the 1st of January.
4The survey also informs about threats or insults, but I decide to let these types of victimization aside.
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in the first column of Table 1. These figures are obtained pooling the 2007 to 2011 waves
of the victimization survey. The other columns report the figures for various types of urban
units, according to their population size and their degree of urbanization. Expectedly, the
probability of victimization is higher in larger urban units (more than 50,000 inhabitants) and
in the Paris urban unit than in less populated and rural areas. It is also clear from this table
that occurrences of victimization are very rare events, which does not ease their study. The
survey reveals that very few households or individuals report repeated occurrence of a given
type of victimization, so that considering the occurrence of an event or its number does not
make a large difference (this is not in the table).
When a victimization is reported, the respondent gives details about the circumstances,
declaration to the police, consequences (physical injuries, protection behavior), and offender
(e.g. when s/he was seen or arrested). The data also contain detailed information on house-
holds such as income, home ownership status or number of children, as well as individual
characteristics such as age, gender, socio-economic category, education, income and national
origins. Descriptive statistics of household and individual characteristics are reported in Ta-
ble 2. In addition, the survey describes the neighborhood: the pollster characterizes the type
of housings in the neighborhood and indicates whether s/he observes evidence of vandalism
(burnt cars for instance). The respondent also reports whether s/he was aware of any crime
or alcohol or drug related incident in the neighborhood and characterizes the general quality
of the neighborhood (street light, green spaces, buildings aspect, bunch of people hanging
around). Finally, the respondent rates her/his feeling of insecurity.
All this information is available in the public version of the survey. I also have access to
more sensitive information, through a Secure Remote Center of Access to the Data (Centre
d’Accès Sécurisé Distant, CASD). In particular, I am able to localize the precise neighbor-
hood where the surveyed households live. This local area, called IRIS (Ilots Regroupés pour
l’Information Statistique) is the smallest census tract unit for which representative indicators
can be constructed in France. All French municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants
and most of the municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants are divided into several
IRISes. Each IRIS is defined so as to be an homogeneous area in terms of living environment,
and its borders follow the main topographical and landscape frontiers (e.g. roads, railways
and rivers). The target size of an IRIS is 2,000 inhabitants, so that IRISes actually include
between 1,800 and 5,000 inhabitants.5 To give an idea of the level of aggregation, there are
about 50,000 IRISes in France (for around 36,000 municipalities). By comparison, there are
5The IRISes are thus comparable in terms of population size, but not necessarily in terms of geographical
space. Typically, a small village in the countryside is not divided into IRISes and is actually an IRIS of its own,
while cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants are divided into several IRISes. The denser the city considered,
the smaller the size of its IRISes.
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96 départements in France, the geographical unit used by Fougère et al. (2009).6 For the
sake of illustration, Figure 1 shows a map of Paris divided into IRISes. This is of course an
extreme example with very small IRISes due to the high population density in Paris. In the
remainder of the paper, I will interchangeably refer to IRIS or neighborhood.
Figure 1: Paris map of IRISes
Because each wave of the CVS survey comprises about 16,000 observations, there are very
few observations in each IRIS (2.3 observations per IRIS per year on average). Working at
such a small scale thus prevents me from computing representative victimization rates at
the IRIS level. Instead, I use variables indicating whether each individual or household has
ever experienced victimization over the past two years. On the bright side, working at the
IRIS level presents a major advantage: it enables me to supplement the victimization data
with social, economic and demographic characteristics representative of the IRIS. Indeed, the
INSEE designed the IRIS to be the primary statistical unit of the census. Most of the French
statistical data sources are therefore based on this geographical unit, so that it is easy to match
information at the IRIS level. Using the French population censuses from 2006 to 2009, I can
enrich the CVS survey data with socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the IRIS,
at the time of the survey. Since 2004, the population census has been conducted annually, in
a continuous way, and each wave contains information collected over five consecutive years.7
For instance, the 2006 census was conducted over the 2004 to 2008 period. Individuals living
in municipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants are all surveyed once over the period. For
municipalities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, 8 % of the population is surveyed each year,
6Bianchi et al. (2012) rely on Italian Provinces, that adds up to a total of 95 units, and most studies on the
US are done at the county level, that adds up to 3,140 units.
7Prior to 2004, the population census was conducted every decade on average, the latest one dating back
from 1999.
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so that 40 % of the population is included in the final census data. Because the CVS survey
data of a given year concern events that happened over the previous two years, I match them
with the census data of the previous year, to be as close as possible in terms of dates: the 2007
wave of the CVS survey is hence matched with the 2006 census data and so on. To be more
precise, I enrich the CVS survey data with the following characteristics, representative at the
IRIS level: unemployment rate, share of single-parent households, share of immigrants, share
of public housing units, share of households arrived less than two years ago and share of 14-18
years old. Furthermore, I can retrieve the IRIS median household income (per consumption
unit) from tax surveys. The median household income of a given IRIS is averaged over two
consecutive years (weighted by the number of consumption units) and then matched to the
following wave of the CVS survey. For instance, the observations from the 2007 wave of the
CVS survey are matched with the average median income of 2005 and 2006. Table 3 describes
the most relevant contextual variables accounting for households’ living environment.
3 Preliminary results
3.1 Empirical methodology
When a victimization is reported in the survey, information is gathered about the circum-
stances in which it happened. In particular, the respondent has to indicate whether it took
place in his/her own neighborhood or in some non-specified other place. As I am interested in
the local determinants of victimization, I restrict the victimization occurrence to the events
that happened in one’s own neighborhood, which I am actually able to identify and to char-
acterize. I can then control for the socio-economic environment of the IRIS where the event
occurred. Hence, for all types of victimization considered, the dependent variable takes on
value 1 if the household or the individual was offended in his own neighborhood and 0 other-
wise, i.e. if the offence happened outside the neighborhood or if no offence happened at all.
Table 4 documents the extent to which victimization happens in the neighborhood. It shows
that most of the household victimization happens in the neighborhood, while the reverse is
true for individual victimization. Limiting the study to victimization that happened in the
victim’s neighborhood can hence be an issue for individual victimization, but it is the only
way to control for contextual characteristics.8
Let i, j and k indicate respectively individual, household and IRIS. For each outcome
considered, I estimate the following equation.
V ICTijk = α+ βXi + γYj + δZk + εijk (1)
8Excluding the observations for which a victimization happened outside of the neighborhood does not
significantly affect the results.
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where V ICTijk is a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of a given type of victimization
at least once over the preceding two years. In the case of a household victimization i stands for
the household head, j for the household and k for the IRIS, while in the case of an individual
victimization, i stands for the surveyed individual. Xi is a vector of characteristics of the
household head or of the interviewed individual according to the type of victimization consid-
ered (household or individual respectively). Then, Yj is a vector of household characteristics
and Zk a vector of social, economic and demographic characteristics of the IRIS, along with
other contextual variables that are detailed below. All results presented below derive from the
estimation of a linear probability model, using OLS estimates, with robust standard errors
clustered at the IRIS level.9
Two broad sets of variables are used in the regressions: one to control for the living
environment in a general sense (Zk) and another to control for individual and household
characteristics (Xi and Yj). Regarding contextual variables, I control for social, economic
and demographic neighborhood (IRIS) characteristics: median annual household income (in
log), unemployment rate, share of immigrants, share of households living in the public hous-
ing sector, share of 14-18-year-old individuals, share of single-parent families (monoparental)
and share of households that have been living in the IRIS for less than two years (recent
movers). As population density is known to be an important factor of crime, I control for
the population density of the municipality (I do not know the density of the IRIS), along
with an indicator of the size of the urban unit in which the IRIS is located. I also include a
variable from the CVS survey describing the type of buildings in the neighborhood (dispersed
houses out of the city, houses in a lot or in the city, apartment blocks in the city or in the
suburbs). Département fixed effects are also included as contextual variables, with the intent
of capturing more aggregate characteristics. In particular, the police force is organized at the
département level (préfecture). Regarding household characteristics, the following controls are
used: household monthly income (in three categories), ownership status (owner, tenant in the
private housing sector or tenant in the public housing sector) and number of children in the
household. As far as individual (respectively household head) characteristics are concerned,
age, gender, nationality, occupation status and socio-economic category of the surveyed in-
dividual (respectively household head) are included in regressions of individual (respectively
household) victimization.
9I have also run probit regressions, obtaining qualitatively similar results, which are available upon request.
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3.2 Contextual versus individual determinants
As a first step of the analysis, I compare the role played by contextual variables to that played
by individual variables, with two purposes in mind. One is to give a broad idea of the type
of characteristics determining victimization, especially as victims’ characteristics were never
accounted for in the preceding literature. The other purpose is to give a first insight about
the way offenders behave: do they target a specific house, car, or individual, or do they rather
primarily target a neighborhood? To do so, I run regressions of the various types of vic-
timization on different sets of controls, alternatively controlling for contextual and individual
characteristics. Table 5 displays the adjusted R-squared of the various regressions, where each
row stands for a given dependent variables (victimization), while each column corresponds to
a different specification. Columns (1) to (4) include various sets of contextual variables, with
column (4) including them all. Similarly, columns (5) to (7) include various sets of individ-
ual and household characteristics, with column (7) including them all. Finally, specifications
including contextual, individual and household sets of variables are reported in column (8).10
Of course, none of the R-squared is very large, mostly due to the nature of the dependent
variables: not only are they binary variables, but also with a very small number of "ones". In
addition victimization is very likely explained to a large extent by unobserved factors such
as individuals’ behavior or the way people or goods look.11 Still, we can note from this table
and in particular from the comparison of columns (4) and (7), that contextual variables play
a more important role than household and individual characteristics for both household and
individual victimization. Assaults are the exception for which the reverse is true. Therefore,
it looks as if the decision to commit a crime was determined by neighborhood rather than
potential victims’ characteristics. It is also interesting to note that among the various sets of
contextual variables used, département fixed effects seem to matter the least, meaning that
local environment characteristics explain victimization better than those measured on a larger
geographic scale.
Let me now turn to a more detailed description of the results. Table 6 reports the esti-
mates from the regressions of the various types of household victimization on all contextual
and individual characteristics and including year fixed effects to ensure that we capture any
time trend in victimization, related to changes in laws, or economic situation for instance.
The corresponding results for individual victimization are reported in Table 7. Regarding
neighborhood characteristics, the coefficients for the unemployment rate and the share of
10The results of the corresponding regressions are not shown here but are available upon request.
11For instance, an individual is less likely to get his/her phone stolen if it in a bag than if it is on a table at
a cafe terrace. Similarly, a very strong and fit man risks less of being assaulted than a very thin one.
It is important to bear in mind that what we observe from the survey might be intrinsically biased precisely
because of behavior. Indeed, some people are more cautious, do not walk alone at night, protect their home
and their car, and are therefore less likely to record a victimization.
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households recently arrived are positive and significant for most of the victimization types.
A possible interpretation for the latter is that the larger the share of recent movers, the less
neighbors know each other, and hence the less likely they are to organize some kind of collec-
tive neighborhood watching. Another interpretation pertaining to the social disorganization
theory is that weaker social ties undermine the ability of a community to exercise informal
control over its members. The effect of unemployment rate is particularly large for motorbike
theft, car vandalism and assault. Because these are non-lucrative and violent offenses, this ef-
fect also seems in line with social disorganization theory, reflecting social rather than financial
deprivation. The strong relationship of unemployment with burglaries is less intuitive, as it
suggests that burglars live and burgle in the same neighborhood. One interpretation could be
that the burglaries happening in high unemployment neighborhoods are more about stealing
goods for their personal use (e.g. TV sets, video game consoles, food) than for reselling them
(e.g. jewelry, works of art). A possible alternative explanation is that it is easier to observe
one’s own neighbors and to know when they are away from home.
Although it is one of the main drivers of people’s feeling of insecurity,12 the share of
immigrants is almost never significant, in line with the recent paper by Bianchi et al. (2012).13
The type of neighborhood is also particularly relevant for most types of victimization. As
expected, households living in residential areas made of groups of houses are more likely
to be offended than those living in isolated houses in the countryside. Households living in
apartments buildings are less likely to be burgled, but more likely to have their car vandalized,
especially if they live in the suburbs.14 Now taking a quick look at household and individual
characteristics, we can see that wealthier households suffer more of home vandalism, but
less of car vandalism, while their members are less likely assaulted. The result for cars is
probably explained by the fact that wealthier household park their cars in a closed or secured
space. Households with an unemployed head are more likely to be victims of burglary, home
vandalism, and car theft. Similarly, unemployed individuals are more likely to suffer from
violent crimes (robberies and assaults). Older individuals tend to be less victimized. Gender
does not affect the probability of theft or robbery, but males are more victims of assaults than
females.
4 The issue of location selection
A major concern with this low geographic setting, that is common in the literature on neigh-
borhood effects, is that households usually sort across neighborhoods in a non-random fashion.
It is then possible that some unobserved household or individual characteristics influence both
12These results are not shown in the paper but are available upon request.
13Exceptions are for thefts of objects from cars, and for non-violent individual theft, but these effects are
limited.
14They are also less likely to have their home vandalized, but this is mechanically due to their home type.
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the propensity to be victim of a criminal event and neighborhood characteristics, therefore
biasing the results. Several methods have been used to overcome this endogenous sorting
issue, that I briefly summarize here. A first approach consists in using a measure of the
variable of interest aggregated to a higher geographic level as an instrument for this variable.
For instance, Evans et al. (1992) instrument neighborhood poverty with metropolitan area
poverty. An alternative method is to rely on randomized experiments designed such that
the choice of neighborhood is actually exogenous. On of the most famous examples is the
Moving To Opportunity program in the US, through which randomly selected households are
given housing vouchers, enabling them to relocate in richer neighborhoods. In particular, and
related to the topic of the present study, Ludwig et al. (2001) and Kling et al. (2005) use
this experiment to examine the role of neighborhood characteristics on juvenile crime. These
are, to the best of my knowledge, the only two existing studies researching the impact of
neighborhood effects on crime. However, the very particular setting in which these results are
derived brings some concern regarding their validity in a more general context. Bayer et al.
(2008) review more extensively these alternative methods and discuss their limitations.
The approach adopted in this paper builds on the very local nature of the data. It fol-
lows Bayer et al. (2008) who study the role of neighbors on work location. The idea is that
although households are able to select a given area in which they want to live, they are,
however, unable to pinpoint a precise neighborhood within this given area. This assumption
means that even if households are able to choose a given residential area, there will not be
any correlation in unobserved factors affecting risk of victimization among individuals living
in the same neighborhood within the larger selected area. It is now in order to present a few
arguments supporting this assumption. First, because the housing market is very tight, it is
reasonable to think that a household targeting a given area very unlikely has a choice over
the precise neighborhood where it will end up in this area. This would indeed require that
at least one housing unit satisfying the other decision criteria of the household (e.g. size)
be vacant in each neighborhood within the larger area at the time when the household is
looking for a new place. A second consideration is that it may be difficult for prospecting
households to identify neighborhood-by-neighborhood variation in neighbors and contextual
characteristics, prior to moving into the neighborhood. To put it differently, although the
household may have a realistic ex-ante view on the characteristics of the targeted area, it is
less likely to be actually able to identify differences in these characteristics across the various
neighborhoods of the area. This makes even more sense in the context of victimization, for
which ex-ante information is particularly difficult to gather. Finally, an interesting feature of
the French neighborhoods studied here (the IRISes) is that they do not follow any kind of
administrative frontier. For instance, they are distinct from police districts, and from school
zones determining to which school children must go. Rather, the neighborhoods considered
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here were designed to encompass 2,000 inhabitants on average, and to be homogeneous in
terms of living environment, with borders following the main topographical and landscape
frontiers (e.g. roads, railways and rivers). People ignore where these borders are, and more
generally do not even know what an IRIS is, as it is only used for statistical purpose. For
those reasons, it is practically impossible that households purposely decide to live in a given
IRIS rather than in a contiguous one.
All these arguments support the validity of the assumption that there should be no cor-
relation in unobserved factors affecting victimization among neighbors living in the same
neighborhood (IRIS) within the larger selected area. As a consequence, once we control for
the characteristics of the larger area selected by the individual, the remaining spatial variation
of characteristics across neighborhoods within the larger area is supposed to be exogenous.
This is done through the inclusion of fixed effects of larger areas than the IRISes, literally
called a "large neighborhood" in the French statistical jargon (grand quartier). Large enough
municipalities are divided into several large neighborhoods, which themselves encompass sev-
eral contiguous IRISes. If the municipality is too small, then all the IRISes of the municipality
belong to the same large neighborhood, so that the large neighborhood actually corresponds
to the municipality. Although there is no formal evidence that large neighborhood is the geo-
graphical unit targeted by households when looking for a housing, this area makes a reasonable
reference neighborhood compared to the IRIS. Figure 2 depicts the four large neighborhoods
of Paris 7th arrondissement: each area of specific color is a large neighborhood, and each
subdivision of a large neighborhood is an IRIS.
Figure 2: Paris 7th arrondissement map of Large Neighborhoods
Table 8 summarizes the results of the regressions including large neighborhood fixed ef-
fects instead of département fixed effects. The specification is otherwise similar to the full
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specification presented in the previous section.15 According to these estimates, a larger share
of immigrants in the IRIS would imply a lower probability of being burgled and robbed. On
average, the coefficients on the share of immigrants are lower than in the previous specification
(Tables 6 and 7): the coefficients for theft of objects from cars and theft were significantly
positive and are now driven down to zero (in part due to an increase in the standard errors),
while some of the coefficients that were not significantly different from zero are now signifi-
cantly negative (burglary and robbery). This suggests that controlling for large neighborhood
fixed effects actually corrects a bias induced by the fact that immigrants tend to settle in
more criminogenic areas because of lower rents for instance. The estimates for unemployment
are rather stable for burglary, car vandalism and assault. Yet, they are driven down to zero
for car theft, motorbike theft and bike theft, while the coefficient for robbery becomes slightly
positive. Note also that unemployment seems to be the most relevant characteristic explaining
crime, both in terms of the number of victimization types for which is involved and in terms
of magnitude of the effect.
5 A spatial approach
An important dimension to take into account in the study of crime is criminals’ mobility. To
put it simply, if criminals are not mobile, the larger the number of criminals living in a neigh-
borhood, the more likely the other inhabitants of this neighborhood experience victimization.
On the other hand, if criminals are mobile, then even individuals living in a criminal-free
neighborhood may face a risk of victimization if they are located at some reasonable distance
of a neighborhood populated with criminals. Consider for instance a high unemployment
neighborhood, more likely to breed criminals according to Becker’s theory. The potential
offenders could commit crime in the neighborhood where they reside, if, for instance, they
cannot afford the cost of commuting to a more distant neighborhood, or if they benefit from
observing their neighbors’ habits and routine activities. Alternatively, they could decide to
commit a crime in a more distant neighborhood if they fear to be more easily identified in
their own neighborhood, or if their neighborhood is too deprived to be attractive. Whether
an offender decides to act in his own neighborhood or in a remote one thus reflects a weighting
of the expected gains, the direct costs and the opportunity costs of committing crime in an-
other neighborhood. Therefore, even if we find that unemployment increases victimization on
average, the effect might actually depend on where one lives relative to high unemployment
neighborhoods.
Although the question of criminals’ mobility seems highly relevant when studying deter-
15The coefficients for the variables other than IRIS characteristics are available upon request. They are not
significantly affected by the inclusion of large neighborhood fixed effects.
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minants of victimization, it is not addressed in the economics of crime literature, mainly due
to the fact that most studies rely on aggregate data. By contrast, because I work with data
localized at a low geographic level, I am able to connect individuals not only to the character-
istics of the neighborhood where they live, but also to the characteristics of the neighborhoods
that are further away. This new spatial approach enables me to indirectly account for crim-
inals mobility.16 To this aim, I consider the IRIS where the surveyed individual lives as the
reference neighborhood, and I construct two successive circles of adjacent IRISes to repre-
sent more distant neighborhoods. More precisely, all the IRISes contiguous to a given IRIS
constitute the first ring of adjacent neighborhoods (denoted as IRIS1), while all the IRISes
contiguous to those in the first ring, excluding the reference IRIS and the first ring IRISes
themselves, constitute the second ring of adjacent neighborhoods (denoted as IRIS2). The
map on Figure 3 illustrates the three geographic levels on which I rely. The total area depicted
here represents the seventh arrondissement of Paris. Each subdivision of this district is an
IRIS. Consider for instance the IRIS colored in the darkest shade as the IRIS of reference.
Then, the set of IRISes colored in a slightly lighter shade constitute the first ring of IRISes,
i.e. the area made of all the adjacent IRISes. Finally, the lightest IRISes constitute the second
ring of IRISes, with respect to the reference IRIS.
Using this setting, it is possible to relate any individual or household in the survey to the
characteristics of the neighborhood where it lives, as well as to those of the first and second
rings of adjacent neighborhoods. Thus, I can explore whether a given factor matters more
within the neighborhood or from a remote one. In the following empirical analysis, I will
focus on one particular factor: the unemployment rate. First, as noted at the end of the
previous section, this factor shows the most relevant in explaining victimization. Second, I
make this choice in order to avoid a likely collinearity issue with other IRIS characteristics.
The unemployment rate of a given neighborhood is indeed highly correlated with most of
the other IRIS characteristics (share of immigrants, median income, share of single parents
families and share of public housing), as can be seen from Table 9. Concretely, I compute the
average unemployment rate over all the first and second rings of IRISes respectively, weighted
by the size of the active population in each IRIS. To summarize, and using the same notation
as in section 3, I estimate the following equation:
V ICTijk = α+ βXi + γYj + δUk + ηUk+1 + νUk+2 + εijk (2)
Where Uk is IRIS unemployment rate, Uk+1 the average unemployment rate of the first ring
of adjacent IRISes, and Uk+2 the average unemployment rate of the second ring of adjacent
IRISes.
16It is not direct as I have no information about the offenders, so I am not actually able to locate them.
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Figure 3: Paris 7th arrondissement map of IRIS
Note however that this geographical approach has some drawbacks. First, as I do not
have any information for the road or transportation networks, I am not effectively capturing
transportation time or cost, which are key determinants of mobility. This could be addressed
using the information about road networks provided by the French Institute of Geography
(IGN), and performing a Geography Information System analysis. However, because I do not
have access to these data nor to the technology necessary to deal with it, I keep this step for
future research. Second, this approach with adjacent IRISes does not enable me to directly
capture distance, as IRISes are heterogeneous in terms of size. As mentioned in Section 2,
only municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants are divided into IRISes, and the target
size of an IRIS is 2,000 inhabitants so that denser cities tend to have smaller IRISes. To deal
with this issue, I restrict the sample to municipalities that are actually divided into IRISes,
hence reducing the variation in the size of the IRISes. Such a restriction typically excludes
rural villages, which are quite large IRISes (in terms of surface).
The estimated effects of the unemployment rate in the three successive neighborhood rings
(IRIS, IRIS 1 and IRIS 2) on the various types of victimization are reported in Table 10. The
first set of results displayed are the estimates obtained when no other control is included,
while the second set of results is obtained including the full set of controls. Note that for each
specification, I control for large neighborhood fixed effects to avoid the endogeneity issue, as
discussed in the previous section. Let us first look at the burglaries in column (1). In the no
other control specification, only the unemployment rate in the first ring of adjacent IRISes
is positive and significant at the 10% level. In the full specification, both the IRIS and the
IRIS 1 unemployment rates are significant at the 5% level, with a larger coefficient for the
latter. The results are similar for thefts of objects from cars. The unemployment rate in the
first contiguous neighborhoods is the only significant one that in the full specification. This
suggests that economic types of crimes such as burglary and theft of objects from cars are
better explained by the unemployment rate from more distant places than from the immediate
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neighborhood. This is in line with the idea that when it turns to economic crimes, offenders
are more likely to travel to some remote area. Several considerations can help rationalize
this: stealing from one’s direct neighbors is not financially attractive when one lives in a more
economically deprived neighborhood; the expected financial gain from an economic crime
allows the offender to afford the cost of travelling to a more distant neighborhood; and the
criminal limits the chance to be identified by witnesses when committing an offence in a
different place than the one where he lives. It is then a bit puzzling that the unemployment
rate in the reference IRIS still matters for burglaries. A possible explanation is that there
are two types of burglars: those who travel to a remote place to steal expensive goods they
can resell such as jewelry and works of art, and those who steal very basic goods such as
food or TV sets from their own neighbors for their personal consumption. An alternative
explanation could be that the habits and general behavior of one’s direct neighbor are more
easily observed, so that it simplifies the planning of the crime. It is also surprising not to
find any significant effect on car and motorbike thefts. A possible explanation could be that
stealing this type of goods requires an even longer distance, so that it is more easy to stock
or use the car.17
On the other hand, Table 10 also shows that the unemployment rate in the immediate
neighborhood is particularly relevant in explaining non-economic and violent crimes such as
acts of vandalism, whether on the home or on the car, and assaults. In this case, the social
disorganization theory is more appropriate to understand the mechanisms than the Beckerian
approach.
The concern linked to the IRIS size may persist, with the existence of very small IRISes
in densely populated cities such as Paris. In this case, the distance between two IRISes may
not be relevant, with a null transportation cost across the three contiguous rings of IRISes. In
what follows, I therefore exclude the observations of the three largest cities (Paris, Lyon and
Marseille), hence getting rid of the smallest IRISes. The regressions presented above are then
replicated on this sub-sample. The estimates for unemployment rates in the successive rings of
IRISes in the full specification are reported in Table 11. The previous results are robust to this
sample restriction. The results are stable for burglaries, with a positive effect of direct (IRIS)
unemployment rate and a larger positive effect of more distant (IRIS 1) unemployment. Note
that the gap between the two coefficients is even slightly larger than in the previous table. The
estimates for both acts of vandalism, theft of objects from car and assaults are also similar
to those presented above. There are however two differences compared to the regressions
including large cities: the coefficient for IRIS unemployment rate is now significantly positive
17Note that when département fixed effects are included instead of large neighborhood fixed effects, the
coefficient of uiris1 is positive and significant at the 5% level in the full specification for the car theft regression,
supporting this intuition.
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(at the 10% level) in the motorbike theft and in the robbery equation. To the extent that
robberies are violent crimes by opposition to thefts, this new result tends to comfort the
idea that the direct exposure to unemployment affects violent rather than economic crimes.
The result for motorbike theft could be at odds with this intuition, unless most of the thefts
observed apply to motorcycles rather than to more powerful motorbikes.
6 Conclusion
This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first study on victimization at the neigh-
borhood level. This local approach brings new insights to the economics of crime literature
as it enables me to characterize precisely the context (both location and victim) in which
criminal events occur. By contrast with previous papers based on aggregate police data, I am
therefore able to distinguish between factors related to the opportunity cost of committing
crime (e.g. unemployment, wages) and factors pertaining to the attractiveness of the victims
(e.g. wealth). I find that household and individual characteristics are minor determinants
of household and individual victimization respectively, while the economic situation of the
neighborhood actually matters. In other words, victims (individuals or households) are not
directly targeted (except in the case of assaults): rather, it is the neighborhood where the
mischief occurs that is coveted. In particular, local unemployment rate is found to be strongly
related to household victimization. In order to address the endogenous neighborhood selection
issue, I included "large neighborhood" fixed effects in order to control for the characteristics of
the larger area that the households are likely to have actually selected. Most of the estimates
of neighborhood characteristics are attenuated once selection is corrected for. Yet, the local
unemployment rate remains a strong predictor of several types of victimization.
This paper also sheds new light on the mechanisms behind this relationship, through the
adoption of an original spatial approach. I take advantage of the precise location of the data to
control for the characteristics of both the reference neighborhood and the first and second rings
of adjacent neighborhoods. That way, I can account for heterogeneity across neighborhoods
and hence indirectly for criminals mobility. This is an improvement over the existing literature
which ignores this dimension. The results reveal that for burglaries and thefts of objects
from cars, unemployment rate in the adjacent neighborhoods have a stronger explanatory
power than unemployment in the precise neighborhood where the misdeed occurred. On
the contrary, local unemployment rate dominates over more distant unemployment rates in
explaining vandalism and assaults in particular. A natural interpretation of these findings
is that criminals are mobile for economic crimes but not for violent crimes. In other words,
they can afford some transportation cost when they expect a financial reward from their
mischief, in line with the Beckerian theory of crime. On the other hand, violent crimes and
vandalism escape from this logic and relate more the the social disorganization theory. This
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new method helps understanding more precisely criminal behavior according to the different
types of crimes, and is therefore a key contribution to the literature.
Naturally, the empirical design endorsed in this paper presents some drawbacks and will
be subject to future improvements. For instance, considering only two rings of adjacent
neighborhoods is somehow arbitrary and is an important limitation as criminals may travel
from more remote areas. In particular, car thefts may involve longer distances so as to reduce
the risk of apprehension. This could explain why none of the unemployment rate estimates
(IRIS, IRIS1 and IRIS2) is significant for this type of crime. One of the next developments
of this work will therefore be to take into account all neighborhoods in an exhaustive fashion.
The idea would be to express crime as a function of the sum of unemployment rates in all
surrounding neighborhoods, weighted by distance or transportation costs. In other words,
this would consist in adapting the market-potential function developed in the new economic
geography literature (e.g. Harris, 1954; Hanson, 2005) to the economics of crime literature.
Because it reveals the relevance of a spatial approach and stresses its necessity, the present
paper is a first step in this direction.
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Table 1: Share of households or individuals victimized at least once over the past two years.
Full Rural Less than More than Paris
Sample Areas 50,000 inhab. 50,000 inhab. Urban Unit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household victimization
Burglary Mean 4.61 % 3.81 % 4.01 % 5.20 % 5.18 %
StDev (.210) (.191) (.196) (.222) (.222)
N 85141 16211 19175 35755 13895
Car Mean 3.36 % 1.59 % 2.97 % 4.19 % 4.87 %
Theft StDev (.180) (.125) (.179) (.200) (.215)
N 69226 14953 16599 28183 9413
Motorbike Mean 5.34 % 2.25 % 4.42 % 7.28 % 8.91 %
Theft StDev (.225) (.148) (.205) (.260) (.285)
N 10051 2633 2470 3755 1181
Bike Mean 3.71 % 1.14 % 2.56 % 5.52 % 6.34 %
Theft StDev (.189) (.106) (.158) (.228) (.244)
N 46321 10974 11687 17877 5730
Home Mean 4.13 % 1.93 % 3.93 % 5.68 % 3.69 %
Vandalism StDev (.199) (.138) (.194) (.231) (.188)
N 85142 16214 19177 35751 13895
Car Mean 10.46 % 5.66 % 8.46 % 13.42 % 14.48 %
Vandalism StDev (.306) (.231) (.278) (.341) (.352)
N 69192 14955 16593 28170 9396
Car Object Mean 6.71 % 3.52 % 5.41 % 8.16 % 10.79 %
Theft StDev (.250) (.184) (.226) (.274) (.310)
N 69227 14953 16598 28186 9412
Individual victimization
Robbery Mean 0.95 % 0.29 % 0.54 % 1.13 % 2.09 %
StDev (.097) (.054) (.073) (.106) (.143)
N 85154 16213 19177 35759 13900
Theft Mean 3.38 % 2.46 % 2.88 % 3.74 % 4.62 %
StDev (.181) (.155) (.167) (.190) (.210)
N 85148 16211 19176 35759 13897
Assault Mean 2.42 % 1.76 % 2.03 % 3.09 % 2.34 %
StDev (.154) (.132) (.141) (.173) (.151)
N 85142 16212 19171 35758 13896
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Table 2: Sample characteristics: households and individuals characteristics.
Household Characteristics
[Min - Max] Mean (StDev) Med
Household monthly income:
w ≤ 1500 [0 - 1] 0.313 (0.464) 0
1500 < w ≤ 2500 [0 - 1] 0.294 (0.456) 0
w > 2500 [0 - 1] 0.393 (0.488) 0
Ownership Status:
Owner [0 - 1] 0.598 (0.490) 1
Rent in private market [0 - 1] 0.213 (0.410) 0
Rent in public housing [0 - 1] 0.144 (0.351) 0
Other [0 - 1] 0.045 (0.207) 0
Household composition:
Head with a partner [0 - 1] 0.569 (0.495) 1
Number of children [0 - 11] 0.644 (0.993) 0
Household Head Individual
[Min - Max] Mean (StDev) Med [Min - Max] Mean (StDev) Med
Age [15 - 101] 53.25 (17.87) 52 [14-102] 47.19 (19.62) 46
Gender [0 - 1] 0.622 (0.485) 1 [0 - 1] 0.479 (0.500) 0
Nationality:
Native French [0 - 1] 0.908 (0.290) 1 [0 - 1] 0.907 (0.290) 1
Naturalized French [0 - 1] 0.043 (0.203) 0 [0 - 1] 0.042 (0.201) 0
EU 15 [0 - 1] 0.021 (0.142) 0 [0 - 1] 0.019 (0.136) 0
Other EU (after 2004) [0 - 1] 0.001 (0.037) 0 [0 - 1] 0.001 (0.037) 0
Maghrebian [0 - 1] 0.013 (0.115) 0 [0 - 1] 0.014 (0.118) 0
Other African [0 - 1] 0.005 (0.073) 0 [0 - 1] 0.006 (0.075) 0
Other nationality [0 - 1] 0.009 (0.092) 0 [0 - 1] 0.010 (0.100) 0
Employment status:
Employed [0 - 1] 0.559 (0.496) 1 [0 - 1] 0.488 (0.500) 0
Unemployed [0 - 1] 0.041 (0.198) 0 [0 - 1] 0.059 (0.235) 0
Inactive [0 - 1] 0.340 (0.490) 0 [0 - 1] 0.453 (0.498) 0
Socio-economic Category:
Farmer [0 - 1] 0.014 (0.117) 0 [0 - 1] 0.012 (0.108) 0
Craftsman, shopkeeper [0 - 1] 0.046 (0.209) 0 [0 - 1] 0.034 (0.182) 0
Higher occupation [0 - 1] 0.111 (0.314) 0 [0 - 1] 0.078 (0.269) 0
Intermediate occupation [0 - 1] 0.150 (0.357) 0 [0 - 1] 0.128 (0.334) 0
Employee [0 - 1] 0.130 (0.336) 0 [0 - 1] 0.165 (0.371) 0
Factory worker [0 - 1] 0.155 (0.362) 0 [0 - 1] 0.131 (0.337) 0
Retired [0 - 1] 0.353 (0.478) 0 [0 - 1] 0.286 (0.452) 0
Other inactive [0 - 1] 0.041 (0.198) 0 [0 - 1] 0.166 (0.372) 0
Reading: The head of the average household is 53 years and 3 months old. The average surveyed individual
is about 47 years and 2 months old. 55.9 % of household have an employed head. 48.8 % of individuals are
employed.
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Table 3: Sample characteristics: households living environment
Contextual Variables
[Min - Max] Mean (StDev) Med
IRIS Characteristics:
Share of immigrants [0 - 0.794] 0.079 (0.074) 0.055
Median income (log) [7.69 - 10.98] 9.792 (0.258) 9.784
Unemployment rate [0 - 0.741] 0.112 (0.056) 0.100
Share single-parent families [0 - 0.673] 0.137 (0.068) 0.127
Share hh in public housing [0 - 1] 0.136 (0.187) 0.064
Share of recent movers [0 - 0.935] 0.129 (0.061) 0.116
Share of 14-18 y.o. [0 - 0.239] 0.056 (0.017) 0.056
City density (log) [-1.09 - 10.55] 6.297 (1.955) 6.292
Type of neighborhood:
Dispersed houses [0 - 1] 0.176 (0.381) 0
Houses Lot / in cities [0 - 1] 0.443 (0.497) 0
Apartment block (city) [0 - 1] 0.231 (0.422) 0
Apartment block (suburbs) [0 - 1] 0.091 (0.288) 0
Mixed [0 - 1] 0.059 (0.235) 0
Size of the Urban Unit:
Rural Areas [0 - 1] 0.226 (0.418) 0
Less than 50,000 [0 - 1] 0.251 (0.433) 0
More than 50,000 [0 - 1] 0.365 (0.481) 0
Paris Urban Unit [0 - 1] 0.158 (0.165) 0
Reading: The average household lives in an IRIS where there are 7.9 % of immigrants. 59.8 % of households
own their home. The head of household lives with a partner in 56.9 % of households.
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Table 4: Probability that the incident occurs in own’s neighborhood
Mean (StDev) N
Household Victimization
Car theft 0.724 (0.447) 2,052
Motorbike theft 0.643 (0.479) 497
Bike theft 0.755 (0.430) 1,620
Vandalism on the car 0.657 (0.475) 6,581
Theft of object from car 0.289 (0.454) 4,080
Individual Victimization
Robbery 0.396 (0.489) 633
Theft 0.301 (0.459) 2,308
Assault 0.372 (0.484) 1,725
When at least one offence is reported, more details are asked about the latest event. In particular, the
respondent indicates whether the incident happened in one’s "own village or neighborhood". Reading: 72.4 %
of the latest car theft happened in the owner’s neighborhood. 37.2 % of the latest assaults occurred in the
victim’s neighborhood.
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Table 7: Individual Victimization: Full Specification
Robbery Theft Assault
(1) (2) (3)
Neighborhood characteristics
Share of Immigrants 0.004 0.022* 0.001
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Median Income (log) -0.004** -0.003 0.008**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Unemployment rate 0.013 0.000 0.048***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Share Monoparental 0.000 0.018* -0.000
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Share Public Housing -0.008** -0.011** 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Share Recent Movers 0.013* 0.023** 0.021**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Share 14-18 y.o. 0.010 -0.030 -0.042
(0.023) (0.032) (0.030)
City Density (log) 0.001** 0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Type of buildings in the neighborhood (Ref: Dispersed houses)
Houses Lot / in cities -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Apartment block (city) 0.002 0.004** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Apartment block (suburbs) -0.001 0.002 0.006**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Mixed -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Size of the Urban Unit (Ref: Rural Areas)
Less than 50,000 -0.001* -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
More than 50,000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Paris Urban Unit 0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Household income (Ref: bottom 30%)
Middle 30% -0.001 -0.001 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Top 30% -0.001* -0.002 -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Ownership Status (Ref: Owner)
Rent in private market -0.000 -0.001 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rent in public housing 0.000 0.001 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Other 0.002 -0.001 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of children in hh 0.000 -0.000 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Standard errors clustered at the IRIS level are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001
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Table 7: Individual Victimization: Full Specification (C’ed)
Robbery Theft Assault
(1) (2) (3)
Nationality (Ref: Native French)
Naturalized French -0.000 0.000 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
EU 15 0.000 -0.006** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Other EU (after 2004) 0.003 -0.006 -0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Maghrebian -0.003 -0.004 -0.009**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Other African 0.004 -0.001 -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Other nationality -0.001 0.002 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Employment Status (Ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.003** 0.003 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Inactive 0.005 0.009* -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Age (log) -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.001 -0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Socio Economic Category (Ref: Higher Occupation)
Farmer 0.001 0.028*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002)
Craftsman 0.006** 0.008** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Intermediate 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Employee 0.001 0.001 0.003*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Factory worker -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Retired -0.002 -0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Other inactive -0.002 -0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Intercept 0.049** 0.057 -0.040
(0.022) (0.039) (0.035)
Département f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Year f.e. Yes Yes Yes
N 63655.000 63653.000 63649.000
Adj. R2 0.005 0.005 0.008
Standard errors clustered at the IRIS level are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001
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Table 9: Correlation between IRIS characteristics
Share Median Unemployment Share Share Share Share
Immigrants Income Rate Single Public Recent 14-18
Parent Housing Movers y.o.
Share Immigrants 1.000
Median Income -0.255 1.000
Unemployment Rate 0.528 -0.645 1.000
Share Single Parent 0.496 -0.457 0.671 1.000
Share Public Housing 0.505 -0.527 0.661 0.697 1.000
Share Recent Movers 0.066 0.049 0.126 0.191 -0.104 1.000
Share 14-18 0.128 -0.158 0.225 0.161 0.292 -0.151 1.000
These correlations are obtained using one observation per IRIS per year. The numbers in the columns of the
first line correspond to the numbers in the lines of the first column. For instance, (1) stands for the Share of
Immigrants, so that "-2.255" is the correlation between the share of immigrants in an IRIS in a given year and
the median income in the same IRIS and year.
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